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Abstract: The objective scope of this analysis is focused on selected problems of the 
Polish energy policy. The text addresses three groups of issues connected with Polish 
energy policy: (1) institutional and legal matters, (2) forecasting, and (3) problems. 
In the first case, attention is given to the statutory solutions with regard to the goals, 
tasks, the model and the elements of the energy policy, as well as to the responsibil-
ity of different entities for its implementation. In the second case, scenarios for the 
development of the energy policy are presented; they are also subjected to a brief 
comparative analysis. In the third case, attention is given to the presentation of the 
following issues: (1) energy dependence, (2) energy monoculture, (3) the level of 
development of renewable energy sources, (4) emissions performance, and (5) energy 
efficiency. In order for the research problem to be elaborated, the text features the 
following research questions: (1) to what extent do institutional and legal solutions 
affect the effectiveness of the energy policy pursued in Poland?; (2) which scenario 
for the development of Polish energy policy should be deemed most likely?; (3) which 
problem issues singled out in the analysis should be regarded as the greatest challenge 
to the Polish energy policy?
Key words: energy policy, energy forecasts, energy security, energy production struc-
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Introduction
The object of analysis in the present text is concerned with the Polish energy policy from the institutional-legal, forecast and problem as-
pect. In the first case, the analysis will focus on the statutory solutions 
related to the goals, tasks, the elements as well as the model of energy 
policy, also within the compass of the entities pursuing the energy policy 
in Poland. In the second case, scenarios for the development of an en-
ergy policy and their comparative analysis will be presented. In the third 
case, a selection of the Polish energy policy as well as challenges to the 
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entities responsible for their implementation will be presented. The chief 
problem issues have been recognised as: (1) energy dependence, (2) en-
ergy monoculture, (3) a development level of renewable energy sources, 
including low-emission ones, (4) emission performance, and (5) energy 
efficiency. The individual issues, that is the selected diagnostic features 
of the energy policy, have been illustrated with the analyses of the index 
values. The following indexes have been considered crucial: (1) the en-
ergy dependence index, (2) the Stirling index, (3) the index of renewable 
energy use, (4) the emission performance indexes, and (5) the energy ef-
ficiency indexes.
The main goal of the analysis is to present the crucial issues and chal-
lenges that the Polish energy policy is facing. In order that the research 
problem can be elaborated, the text features the following research ques-
tions: (1) To what extent do institutional and legal solutions affect the ef-
fectiveness of the energy policy pursued in Poland?, (2) Which one of the 
scenarios for the development of the Polish energy policy should be deemed 
most likely?, (3) Which ones of the problem issues singled out in the analysis 
should be regarded as the greatest challenge to the Polish energy policy?
The analysis included in the text is of an informative character, and 
hence the conducted research will consist in elaboration of and a synthetic 
approach to secondary data. It is, however, to be noted that the collected 
quantitative and qualitative secondary data will be supplemented with the 
author’s own conclusions and opinions. In the case of the analysis of the 
quantitative secondary data, where the Stirling index is used, the author’s 
own calculations will be performed. In the case of the description of the 
term of energy policy and the subjective scope of energy policy, the legal-
institutional approach has been adopted. In the case of the description of 
the forecasting aspects of Poland’s energy policy, a comparative analysis 
will be performed for the three exploratory scenarios contained in the 
draft energy policy of 2015.
1. Description of legal and institutional aspects of energy policy
1.1. Concept of energy policy
While analysing energy policy in the institutional and legal approach, 
attention should be given to political activities of an instrumental charac-
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ter. In the case of Poland, the instrumentalism is of a negative character, 
and one of its effects is a low level of statutory law established by the 
legislator. The bad quality of the statutory law above all concerns such 
issues as its clarity, systematicity and lack of stability (cf. Rosicki, 2015a, 
pp. 51–62).
The lack of reasonable and long-term strategic plans in the energy sec-
tor – despite the existence of many “policies” and “strategies” concerned 
with energy issues – is a crucial problem. The lack of real accountability 
for non-performance of the guidelines contained, among others, in the 
document specified in the Energy Law Act (Chapter III, Art. 13–15, UPE), 
which gives rise to the lack of rationality in the investment and planning 
process.
Another one of the problems related to the legal aspects of energy policy 
is the one concerned with its character within the structure of administra-
tive and constitutional law. The document on energy policy is drawn up by 
the Minister of Energy, and then it is approved by way of resolution by the 
Council of Ministers. It must, however, be stressed that the resolutions of 
the Council of Ministers are of an internal character and are only applicable 
to organisational units subordinate to the body issuing such acts (Art. 93 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Poland). In addition, the effect of the res-
olution is the acceptance of the document of a “planning” character, which 
is of no binding force in the sense that non-implementation does not result 
in any legal consequences, e.g. accountability on the part of the Council 
of Ministers or the Minister of Energy (cf. Czarnecka, Ogłódek, 2007, pp. 
331–334; Elżanowski, 2008, pp. 77–80; Waligórski, 2008, pp. 69–74). The 
consequence of such a solution is a document of a blanket character, which 
in turn gives rise to a question about credibility and stability of the energy 
policy pursued by the executive in Poland.
The main instruments of energy policy have been defined in the third 
chapter of the Energy Law Act. Analysing the particular articles in the 
above-mentioned chapter of the act, one can distinguish various under-
standings of the concept and term of “energy policy”: (1) defining the 
goals of energy policy (Art. 13 UPE), (2) defining the tasks and the action 
model (Art. 12 UPE), (3) describing the elements of the “energy policy” 
document (Art. 14–15 UPE), (4) pointing at the bodies responsible for 
“energy policy” (Art. 12 and 12a UPE) (cf. Czarnecka, Ogłódek, 2007, 
pp. 325–363; Pawełczyk, Pikiewicz, 2012, pp. 430–482).
As one attempts to divide the content of the articles in the third chapter, 
one can distinguish the following issues concerned with “energy policy”: 
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(1) an energy policy strategy (Art. 12 UPE), (2) a specific document on en-
ergy policy (Art. 13–15a UPE), (3) energy security monitoring (Art. 15b 
UPE), (4) the competitive energy market (Art. 15c and 15f UPE), (5) re-
quirements for energy companies (Art. 16–16b UPE), (6) a local energy 
policy (Art. 17–20 UPE).
The obligatory objective scope of the planning document, referred 
to as the “national energy policy,” encompasses the following issues: 
(1) a country’s fuel-energy balance; (2) generation capacity of the domes-
tic fuel and energy sources; (3) transmission capacity, including cross-
border connections; (4) energy efficiency of the economy; (5) environ-
mental conservation activities; (6) development of the renewable energy 
source installation use; (7) quantities and kinds of fuel reserves; (8) di-
rections of restructuring and ownership changes in the fuel and energy 
sector; (9) directions of scientific and research work; (10) international 
cooperation (Art. 14 UPE). Despite precisely pointing to the main items 
in the content of the planning document, the literature levels accusations 
of the quality of the issues under preparation, e.g. attention is drawn to 
the inadequate elaboration of Poland’s fuel-energy balance, which may 
result from the lack of statutory regulation of its content (cf. Zawiska, 
2016, pp. 58–64).
1.2. Subjective scope of energy policy
For quite some time it has been proposed that the energy policy be 
formulated by a specially separated ministry (cf. Rewizorski, Rosicki, 
Ostant, 2013, pp. 311–314; Rosicki, 2015a, pp. 51–62). The Ministry of 
Energy was established by virtue of the Act of 19 November 2015 to 
amend the Act on government administration departments and some oth-
er Acts (as amended on 11 February 2016) (Journal of Laws 2015, item 
1960). Until that time the tasks and authority assigned to the Ministry of 
Energy were executed by the Ministry of Economy, so the energy indus-
try was assigned to the economy sector. It appears that the new solution 
may, in principle, be assessed positively, for the Polish energy industry 
will necessitate more effective action, also in the institutional dimension. 
Besides, specialisation is a natural process of contemporary administra-
tion development, including the central government level (cf. Swora, 
2012, p. 105 onwards). Even though some arguments are put forward, 
whereby such institutional fragmentation will be less rational in some 
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scopes. For instance, M. Swora and M. Stefaniuk claim that the former 
solution offered more possibility for reconciling various interests in one 
government department (Swora, Stefaniuk, 2016, pp. 39–40). While ana-
lysing the changes, another demand may be made – it concerns the need 
to consolidate at least selected environmental conservation departments 
and energy generation, and thus to extend the formula of the Ministry of 
Energy activity.
The tasks of the Ministry of Energy are laid down in Art. 12, Para 2 of 
the Energy Law Act (UPE), where the following is pointed to: (1) drafting 
the national energy policy and coordination of its implementation; (2) de-
fining detailed conditions of planning and functioning of the systems for 
fuel and energy supply, in the mode and scope specified in the act; (3) su-
pervision of the security of gaseous fuel and electrical energy supply as 
well as supervision of the operation of the domestic energy systems in the 
scope specified by the act; (4) cooperation with province governors and 
local authorities in planning and implementation of fuel and energy sup-
ply systems; (5) coordination of cooperation with international govern-
ment organisations in the scope specified in the act.
Despite the changes, and given the appointment of the Minister of En-
ergy, the deliberations concerned with his role as the body supervising the 
energy policy are still topical. His position results from the separation of 
the function to create energy policy in the strategic and systemic dimen-
sion from the regulatory function on the energy market. Hence, this can 
serve as an example supporting the claim that the supervision of energy 
policy is situated at the political (ministerial) level and the level of central 
administration institutions. Consequently, there is the necessity to point to 
other entities connected with the sphere of energy policy, e.g. the Presi-
dent of the Energy Regulatory Office, or the Government Plenipotentiary 
for Strategic Energy Infrastructure.
2. Description of forecast aspects of energy policy
2.1. Scenarios of energy policy
The premises of the Polish energy policy provide for three main 
scenarios, that is (1) a balanced scenario, (2) a nuclear scenario, and 
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(3) a scenario based on the development of the RES sector and the gas 
sector (gas + RES). Distinguishing individual scenarios was a result of 
the adopted goals which should actuate the Polish energy policy, among 
others: (1) the necessity to limit the negative impact of the energy sector 
on the natural environment, (2) the necessity to effectuate the assump-
tions of the energy policy of the European Union, (3) the necessity to 
verify the costs of hard and lignite coal mining, (4) the necessity to con-
sider the reasonableness of the development of the nuclear energy indus-
try, (5) the necessity to precisely define the potential of conventional and 
unconventional gas, (6) the necessity to precisely define the potential of 
unconventional energy sources (Projekt Polityki energetycznej Polski do 
2050 roku, 2015).
The first scenario, that is the balanced scenario, provides for a lack 
of particularly revolutionary changes to Poland’s energy structure. This 
scenario points to the need to continue the former trends and assump-
tions in the domestic energy policy. The forecast assumptions in this vari-
ant involve a lesser risk of possible costs should erroneous decisions be 
made with regard to the energy sector. It is noteworthy that the period 
2035–2050 is projected to be characterised by a certain degree of stabil-
ity, which means that Poland’s energy balance would not undergo major 
changes. Still, it must be stressed that the renewable energy sources and 
gas would be gaining more and more significance in the energy struc-
ture, while coal and oil would preserve their substantial – and yet limited 
compared to the current state – role (Ciechanowska, 2014, pp. 839–842; 
Projekt Polityki energetycznej Polski do 2050 roku, 2015).
In the case of the balanced scenario an increase in the energy balance 
share for the renewable source energy is expected (as a result of the reali-
sations following from the EU regulations concerned with the obligations 
to ensure a RES share of at least 10% in transport fuels, and of 15% in the 
primary energy balance and goals concerned with emission reduction). Be-
sides, given the necessity to build a uniform energy market in the European 
Union and to strengthen the old transmission infrastructure, there will be 
a need to increase the investment outlays on the development of (smart) 
transmission and distribution grids, including the extension of inter-system 
connections with a view to increasing the transmission capacity. Maintain-
ing a steady rise of gas share in the electrical energy generation structure 
(three-and-a-half-fold increase compared to 2015) will require a proper en-
gineering and technical staff (Wnioski z analiz prognostycznych..., 2014; 
Projekt Polityki energetycznej Polski do 2050 roku, 2015).
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The second one of the proposed scenarios is a nuclear scenario, which 
does not appear to be the most real one. It must be pointed out that the 
outlays on the realisation of this undertaking would be the greatest, which 
is connected with substantial investment costs, as well as the costs con-
cerned with the development of human resources. Still, it is noteworthy 
that in the future the investment costs might be offset by relatively low 
costs of fuel acquisition (cf. Badyda, Kuźniewski, 2015, pp. 695–700; 
Bartnik, Hnydiuk-Stefan, 2016, pp. 257–263).
It is worth pointing out that the development of the nuclear sector might 
bring positive results in the scope of: (1) energy security (understood as 
security of energy supply and diversification within the energy structure), 
(2) reduction of the energy sector emission performance, (3) energy ef-
ficiency (understood as losses in the energy transformation processes) (cf. 
Kubowski, 2016). Hence, increasing the energy security would consist in 
reducing the threat of power outages, enhancing the stability of electrical 
energy production, while diversifying the structure of electrical energy 
generation. Threats resulting from mechanisms for ensuring access to nu-
clear fuel can be regarded as a risk in the energy supply chain.
The third one of the proposed scenarios is the gas + RES scenario, 
which appears to be feasible, particularly when we take into consideration 
the development of transmission grids and the plans to create a gas hub 
in Poland. In this scenario, the share of the two main carriers, that is gas 
and RES, in the energy balance would amount to 50–55%. The realisation 
of the scenario assumptions will result in: (1) a substantial elimination of 
the emissions in the Polish energy sector, (2) a substantial diversification 
of the energy structure. Preserving the sources of great installed power 
capacity allows for an effective use of distributed and less stable renew-
able sources in the situation of problems with electrical grid balancing 
(Bukowski, Śniegocki, 2011; Projekt Polityki energetycznej Polski do 
2050 roku, 2015).
The gas + RES scenario will require continual outlays on the gas trans-
mission and distribution infrastructure, but above all on gas-fired power 
plants. The realisation of this scenario will also require a development of 
gas storage infrastructure so as to eliminate threats to gas supply security. 
Besides, it seems that the heralded extensive mining of unconventional 
gas in Poland will take place on account of the geological, but above all 
economic conditions. Hence, the activities geared towards development 
of the transnational gas transmission infrastructure should be intensified 
(cf. Pronińska, 2013, pp. 42–67; Rosicki, 2015b, pp. 133–148).
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2.2. Evaluation of the energy policy scenarios
While comparing the scenarios of the energy industry development, 
it must be assumed that all long-term forecasts and long-term scenario 
methods are fraught with a strong possibility of error. This does not 
mean that the main advantages of the individual energy policy scenar-
ios cannot be pointed out. In the case of the balanced scenario, which 
can be deemed most probable – even though political factors might af-
fect this – it must be stated that it is the least problematic one for the 
country’s current economic structure. However, maintaining a consid-
erable share of solid fuels in the country’s energy structure for a long 
time would be its disadvantage. Furthermore, compared to the other 
scenarios, the realisation of this one will involve the least reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions.
In the case of the gas-RES scenario, compared to the others, we would 
witness a substantial reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, and by ex-
tension an improvement of air quality in Poland. In order to realise this 
scenario, activities aimed at the development of transmission and dis-
tribution grids would have to be intensified, both for gas and electrical 
energy. Besides, activities aimed at the liberalisation of the energy mar-
kets would have to be undertaken, with a view to facilitating economic 
development and creating the most favourable conditions for consumers 
as well as a prosumer-friendly market.
The assessment of the nuclear scenario and of the development of 
the nuclear program itself ought to be negative, not because of the rea-
sonableness or non-reasonableness of the creation of this type of energy 
industry, but because of the unclear and hardly decisive political action 
in this respect. It must be pointed out that the realisation of the program 
of a nuclear power plant construction is rather unlikely in the nearest 
future. The content of the Poland’s Energy Policy Until 2050 draft in-
cluded the stages of the investment realisation, which already at the 
moment of their announcement were unfeasible. It was expected that 
the change of government in Poland in 2015 would bring more com-
mitment to the development of the nuclear energy industry; such an ex-
pectation might have been premised on the emphasis laid on the issues 
of energy supply diversification and security by the new government. 
Till now these premises have not come to fruition in the form of any 
game-changing decisions or political action, since no coherent vision 
on operating plans in this respect has been presented. Furthermore, the 
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economic plans presented after 2015 feature a variety of ways in which 
to develop the energy industry. On the one hand, the announcements 
of the development of the nuclear energy industry with a pre-defined 
installed capacity (6000MW) are continued, but on the other hand in-
novative projects on Gen IV nuclear reactors, that is ones concerned 
with the development of HTR (High Temperature Reactor) and SMR 
(Small Modular Reactor) technologies are presented (cf. Program pol-
skiej energetyki jądrowej, 2014; Uchwała nr 15/2014..., 2014; Uchwała 
nr 14/2016..., 2016; Plan na rzecz Odpowiedzialnego Rozwoju..., 2016; 
Obwieszczenie Ministra Energii..., 2017).
Taking into account the above-mentioned remarks, it must be admitted 
that one should not expect commissioning of commercial nuclear reac-
tors with the announced installed capacity before 2030 (and maybe even 
before 2035). The development of innovative programs of HTR and SMR 
technologies is to be deemed more probable. Still, these assumptions will 
have to be verified on account of political factors: (1) political divisions 
(intergovernmental, inter-party and interparliamentary), (2) interest group 
activity (including energy sector interest groups).
It is worthwhile to stress that as a result of political factors any radical 
solutions based on enterprising decisions aimed at changing the Polish 
energy industry may be treated as less probable. Given the analysis of 
the political and legislative activity between 2004 and 2017, it can be 
concluded that Poland’s international obligations are the decisive factor 
affecting the Polish energy policy – both in the regional and global aspect. 
In the former aspect, Poland’s membership of the European Union is of 
the greatest importance, which involves the necessity to fulfil the require-
ments concerned with the natural environment protection and energy 
generation; the requirements were laid down among the EU states. The 
solutions worked out in the European Union compete against the internal 
policy and the economic situation of Poland. Hence, the energy policy 
directions will be deeply affected by election results. One can assume that 
liberal, left-wing and “pro-EU” parties are more inclined to make deci-
sions changing the main directions of the energy policy. More conserva-
tive and “EU-sceptical” parties prefer decisions favourable to the tradi-
tional energy policy, preserving the significance of conventional carriers 
(hard and lignite coal), while showing a bias against radical solution, as 
well as a minimalist implementation of the energy policy guidelines laid 
down on the European Union level (cf. Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne..., 
2015; Księżopolski, 2015).
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3. Description of main energy policy problems
In the present analysis the following items have been regarded as the 
main problems to the Polish energy policy: (1) energy dependence, (2) en-
ergy monoculture, (3) a development level of renewable energy sources 
(and/or low-emission sources), (4) emission performance, and (5) energy 
efficiency. The individual problems have been linked with indexes allow-
ing for a synthetic description of the enumerated problems. Among these 
indexes reckoned are: (1) the import dependence index, (2) the Stirling 
index, (3) the index of renewable energy use, (4) the indexes of emission 
performance, (5) the indexes of energy efficiency.
The import dependence index is frequently identified with the index 
that is supposed to describe the level of energy security. The link be-
tween this index and security results from the fact that energy security 
is construed as the security of raw material and electrical energy supply 
(cf. Chester, 2010, pp. 887–895; Pronińska, 2012, pp. 21–61; Rosicki, 
2012, pp. 35–66; Winzer, 2012, pp. 36–48; Soroka, 2015, pp. 13–38). The 
analysis presented in the text features both the overall index of import de-
pendence for all the main carriers and the indexes for individual carriers, 
that is gas, petroleum and its products, and coal (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Index of Poland’s import dependence in 2005–2015 (in %)
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Source: Own study based on Eurostat and IEA data.
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The index of import dependence with regard to all the carriers amount-
ed to almost 30% in 2015, which means that it was 25% better than the 
EU mean for all the member states at the same time. The countries with 
indexes better than the one in Poland were Estonia (7.4%), Denmark 
(13.1%) and Romania (17.1%), whereas in Sweden (30.1%), the Czech 
Republic (31.9%) and Bulgaria (35.4%) the index value was close the 
Polish one. It is interesting to note that two decades earlier the index value 
for all the carriers in Poland amounted to –1.2%, which was indicative of 
a high level of energy self-sufficiency (cf. Figure 1).
Poland’s distinguishing feature was the high level of self-sufficiency 
with solid fuels, that is hard and lignite coal, which results from Poland 
being in possession of sizeable reserves and the Polish energy indus-
try relying on them. Despite the fact that Poland has its own reserves, 
the change in the index value of solid fuel dependence is noteworthy. 
In 2005–2015 the index fluctuated, which resulted from the global and 
domestic economic situation, as well as from structural changes in the 
Polish mining industry. The import dependence index for solid fuels 
registered –30.2% in 1995, 23.9% in 2005, whereas 2011 witnessed 
a substantial deterioration in import dependence, which came to be ex-
pressed in the index value reaching –1.1%. In 2015 the index value for 
all the solid fuels registered –11.6%, but it must be emphasised that for 
hard coal the index value was 1.0% in 2014. The situation on global 
markets and on the Polish market, structural changes and an accumu-
lation of problems concerned with the lack of effective political deci-
sions caused the import dependence index value for hard coal to reach 
–31.7% in 1995, –21.3% in 2005, 3.7% in 2010, and five years later it 
amounted to about 1.0% (cf. Figure 1).
Poland shows a high level of import dependence on petroleum and 
petroleum products; one might say that since 1995 this index has not 
registered much change. This is the outcome of a lack of own substan-
tial petroleum reserves and the resulting necessity to heavily rely on im-
port. Diversification of petroleum import sources and directions remains 
a problem, since the eastern direction prevails.
Another one of the carriers on which Poland is heavily dependent is 
gas, but the value of this index is not as high as the one of petroleum, 
which amounted to more than 72% in 2015. The value of this index was 
slightly higher compared to 2005, but it increased by 2.5%, while com-
pared to 1995 it increased by 7.6%. Greater import dependence was to be 
observed with gas liquids (NGL), whereby the import dependence index 
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registered 97.1% in 1995, 97.3% in 2005, and 96.5% in 2014 (cf. EU 
energy in figures..., 2016, pp. 69–71).
While analysing another problem that might be linked with the energy 
generation sector and Poland’s energy policy, attention can be drawn to 
the energy structure diversification. To illustrate Poland’s special situa-
tion, the Stirling index will be used. It must be pointed out that with the 
aid of this index, a diversification of various energy structures can be ana-
lysed, e.g. the primary energy generation structure, the electrical energy 
generation structure, as well as the energy consumption structure. In the 
case of the presented analysis, the Stirling index was used to calculate 
the diversification level of the energy generation and electrical energy 
generation (Kaliski, Staśko, 2003, p. 4; Kaliski, Staśko, 2007, pp. 11–12; 
Kałążna, Rosicki, 2010, pp. 69–73; Leszczyński, 2012, p. 4).
The analysis featured trends in the value changes of the Stirling index 
for “energy generation” and gross electricity generation in 2010–2014. 
In the first case, following the Eurostat methodology, “energy genera-
tion” was construed to encompass primary energy generation along with 
the products obtained otherwise. The main elements of this kind of gen-
eration include: (1) indigenous production, (2) primary product receipts, 
(3) receipts from other sources include supplies of energy commodities, 
the production of which has already been covered in other fuel balances, 
(4) recycled products (Energy Statistics of the European Union..., 2015). 
In the second case, gross electricity generation embraces a total electricity 
quantity that is generated as a result of converting other energy forms, e.g. 
nuclear or wind energy. It also embraces electricity used by auxiliary gen-
erators and transformer losses, that is energy used for purposes of energy 
conversion (Electricity gross generation..., 2017).
The structure of electricity generation and consumption in Poland is 
not balanced, and the same applies to primary energy generation, which 
directly results from heavy reliance of the Polish energy industry on solid 
fuels (hard and lignite coal). From the perspective of energy security as-
sessment, the low value of the Stirling index alone does not have to be 
viewed negatively. For instance, if we make a theoretical assumption that 
Poland would not be obliged to make any changes as to low-emission per-
formance, and the domestic solid fuel reserves were sizeable, and the im-
port dependence index was adequately high, then the threat to the energy 
security would be rather negligible. Still, the necessity to make changes 
as to the low-emission performance, and to develop the renewable energy 
industry enforces a broader context for the analysis of energy diversifica-
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tion. Besides, given the depleted reserves (including the deposits of the 
so-called recoverable coal), diversification of the country’s energy struc-
ture should be one of the main tasks.
The years 2010–2014 brought a visible slight uptrend in the value of 
the Stirling index for energy generation. In this period the value of the 
index was in Poland much lower than the value of the index for all the 
European Union member states. For instance, in 2010 the Stirling index 
value in Poland registered 0.639, in Germany – 1.381, and in the 27 EU 
member states – 1.576. For comparison, in 2014 the value of the index 
in Poland was 0.689, in Germany – 1.397, whereas in the 28 EU member 
states – 1.549 (see Figure 2). Interestingly enough, if scenarios for the 
development of the size and structure of the domestic demand for primary 
energy, according to the same fuels in 2030 and 2050 were taken into ac-
count, then Poland’s situation would considerably improve, for in the first 
case the Stirling index would register 1.435, while in the second case it 
would register 1.556.
Figure 2. The Stirling index value for Poland 2010–2014
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for n=5 amounts to 1.6.
Source: Own study and calculations based on Eurostat and IEA secondary data.
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As for the gross electricity generation in 2010–2014 there is also an 
observable slight uptrend in the Stirling index value. Similarly, like in the 
previous case, the index value for Poland was much lower than the index 
value for all the EU member states. While in Poland the Stirling index 
value for gross electricity generation in 2010 was 0.521, in Germany it 
was 1.360, and in the 27 EU member states it was 1.467. For comparison, 
in 2014 the index value for Poland was 0.619, for Germany – 1.299, while 
for all the 28 EU member states – 1.424 (see Figure 2).
The following are selected to form a group of indexes illustrating the 
use of renewable sources: (1) a share of the renewable energy sources in 
the final gross energy consumption; (2) a degree of electricity generation 
based on renewable sources; (3) a share of renewable sources in trans-
port fuel consumption. Adoption of these indexes makes it possible to 
describe the share of renewable energy sources after energy transition 
in the case of the use of energy by end users, as well as to describe the 
share of renewable energy sources in electricity generation, and the share 
of renewable energy sources in the consumption of fuels in the transport 
sector (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Share of energy from renewable energy sources in Poland 
2005–2014 (in percentage points)
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Source: Own study based on Eurostat data.
ŚSP 2 ’17 Poland’s energy policy: main problems and forecasts 73
As for the increase in the share of renewable energy sources, of great 
importance are the EU requirements and the necessity to implement 
the resolutions concerned with the climate and energy package. The 
homogeneous structure of final and electrical energy production brings 
the share of renewable energy sources down to a small quantity, al-
though there is a visible rise in the share of both final energy consump-
tion and of electrical energy production. As for the index of share of 
renewable energy sources in transport, there is an observable down-
swing in 2012–2014. It is also noteworthy that in 2014 a considerable 
share of the electricity produced from renewable energy sources was in 
the sector of heat generation – it amounted to 67% (cf. Sprawozdanie 
z działalności..., 2016, pp. 39–41).
In 2014 the share of renewable energy sources in the final gross en-
ergy consumption in Poland was 11.4%. With this share Poland ranked 
ninth in this respect among the 28 EU member states, whereas the lower 
share was in: Hungary (9.5%), Cyprus (9.0%), Ireland (8.6%), Belgium 
(8.0%), UK (7.0%), the Netherlands (6.0%), Malta (4.7%) and Luxem-
bourg (4.5%). At the same time the share of renewable energy sources 
in the produced electricity amounted to 12.4%. The lower share was in: 
the Netherlands (10.0%), Cyprus (7.4%), Hungary (7.3%), Luxembourg 
(5.9%) and Malta (3.3%). The share of renewable energy sources in 
2005–2014 consistently rose in Poland, though at the same time there 
were changes to the structure of the share of individual carriers in elec-
tricity generation. Considerable dynamics was observed in wind energy 
generation, while production of energy from solid biofuels remained 
constant and at a high level. In 2015 the share of wind energy generation 
as part of RES generation of electricity amounted to almost 48%, while 
the share of solid biofuels amounted to almost 40% (EU energy in fig-
ures..., 2015; EU energy in figures..., 2016; Energia ze źródeł odnawial-
nych..., 2016, pp. 31–40).
The share of renewable energy sources in the use of transport fuels in 
Poland registered 5.7% in 2014, which – despite negative assessments 
– is a value slightly below the mean for the 28 EU member states. Still, 
it must be stressed that in the same period seventeen EU member states 
registered a lower index share of renewable energy sources than Poland. 
For instance, this group included, among others, Spain (0.5%), Greece 
(1.4%), Portugal (3.4%), Italy (4.5%), Belgium (4.9%), UK (4.9%), 
Ireland (5.2%) and Luxembourg (5.2%) (EU energy in figures..., 2016; 
Energia ze źródeł odnawialnych, 2016, p. 51). Remarkably enough, the 
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development of the sector of renewable energy sources in transport may 
become one of the factors enhancing the dynamics of the country’s eco-
nomic development, even though the lack of clear and stable legal solu-
tions makes such prospects impossible. A major role in the lack of stabil-
ity in this fuel sector is played by ill-considered political decisions, often 
caused by ad-hoc interests of the fiscal and parliamentary policies.
It is worthwhile pointing out that the growth rate of the RES share in 
Poland will be affected by political and institutional factors. For instance, 
from the viewpoint of investors, Poland is characterised by: (1) an un-
transparent legislative process, (2) a poor quality of the established laws, 
(3) a lack of predictable directions in the legislative solutions concerned 
with the support of renewable energy sources and the operation of their 
market. The lack of clear legislative and energy policy planning may, in 
the future, result in a slowdown in the growth of RES share, and in Po-
land’s minimalist commitment to the implementation of more ambitious 
solutions at the EU level, and – depending on the political stand taken 
by a government currently in power – also in obstruction thereof. At the 
same time, attention should be given to the fact that Poland does not fulfil 
its potential concerned with the development of renewable energy sourc-
es, which might positively affect the economic growth.
The greenhouse gas emissions in Poland amounted to 382 Mt (CO2 
equiv.) in 2014, while the emission of CO2 alone amounted to 312.5 
Mt (Million ton CO2). Both the first case and the second one registered 
a downtrend in emissions in 1995–2014 despite a momentary rise (see 
Figure 4). With the data concerned with the value of the GHG emission 
index it is possible to point out that the emission performance of Po-
land in 2014 was reduced by more than 14% compared to 1995, and by 
more than 6% compared to 2010. In the case of the GHG emissions, in 
2014 the countries with higher emissions were only Germany (924.8 Mt), 
UK (556.7 Mt), France (475.4 Mt) and Italy (428 Mt). The emission per-
formance of Spain, whose population outnumbers Poland by more than 
6 million, was in the neighbourhood of that of Poland (342.7 Mt). This 
means that Poland, despite its heavy reliance on coal for energy genera-
tion purposes, was not the largest GHG emitter in the European Union; 
for instance, in 2014 Germany emitted 142% more GHG than Poland. As 
for the emission of CO2 alone, the order is adequate to the GHG emis-
sion, that is Germany – 817.2 Mt, UK – 464.6 Mt, France – 352.6 Mt, 
Italy – 352.2 Mt (cf. EU energy in figures..., 2015; EU energy in figures..., 
2016).
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Figure 4. GHG and CO2 emissions in Poland, 1995–2015 
(million ton CO2 equiv. and million ton CO2)
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Source: Own study based on Eurostat data.
The conclusion that can be drawn from the above analysis is that Poland 
is among the countries leading the way in the development of low-emission 
energy generation; moreover, Poland is not the largest GHG emitter among 
the 28 EU member states despite the fact that such an image of Poland is 
projected in the mass media. Still, this analysis should take into account the 
level of overall energy production, efficiency and emission indexes, given 
the ratio of the number of inhabitants and/or Gross Domestic Product of 
a given country. For instance, the Carbon Intensity index (when converted 
to kg CO2/toe) for Poland registered 3314 in 2014. In the same period, the 
highest index value was in Cyprus (3442) and Greece (3375), whereas in 
Germany, the largest GHG emitter among the 28 EU member states, the 
index was lower than in Poland – 2611 (cf. EU energy in figures..., 2016).
Besides the analysis of the Carbon Intensity index, also the values of 
the CO2 emission per capita index (kg CO2/cap) and the Carbon GDP 
Intensity index (ton CO2/M€’10) are to be compared. In the first case the 
value of the index in Poland was 8221.1, but – like with the GHG and CO2 
emissions alone – there was no longer the usual set of main countries, i.e. 
Germany, UK, France and Italy. The greatest values of the CO2 emission 
per capita index among the 28 EU member states were in Luxembourg 
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(the index value was twice as big as in Poland), Estonia, Germany, the 
Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Finland and Cyprus. In the case of the 
Carbon GDP Intensity index, the value in Poland was 774.6, while in 
Germany it was 298.6. It is worth paying attention to the considerable 
downtrend in the value of this index in Poland, for it amounted to 1910.7 
in 1995. For instance, in the same period a similar index value in Estonia 
dropped by almost 52% (cf. Budzianowski, 2012, pp. 575–581; Trends in 
global CO2 emissions..., 2014; EU energy in figures..., 2016).
The problem of Poland’s emission performance should also be consid-
ered in the context of the emission performance of the energy sector itself 
and the transport sector as part of the GHG and CO2 emission, which is 
connected with fuel combustion. In the case of Poland, the energy gen-
eration sector (160.4 Mt), the transport sector (44.2 Mt) and households 
(37.2 Mt) have the greatest shares in the emission of this kind for GHG. 
There is also an adequate value ratio, as to the order of emissions, in the 
case of CO2 alone (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. GHGs emissions and CO2 emissions from fuel combustion 
activities in 2014 (million ton CO2 equiv. and million ton CO2)
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It is necessary to note that showing Poland as the chief GHG emitter 
among the 28 EU member states does not necessarily adequately depict 
the situation in the European Union. For instance, Germany is the larg-
est GHG emitter among the 28 EU member states, and the largest GHG 
emitter in the energy generation sector, as well as in the transport sector. 
This fact should be emphasised, for Germany – in the debate on the di-
rections of energy policy – is presented as an example for others to fol-
low as regards the low-emission energy industry. Germany emits more 
than twice GHGs in the energy sector and approximately three and a half 
times more in the transport sector than Poland (cf. Environmental Trends 
in Germany..., 2015). For instance, to present the scale of differences in 
the emission performance, one might point to the fact that the Polish en-
ergy sector emits as much CO2 as the German transport sector alone does. 
Still, the thing that typifies Poland is the considerable – in comparison to 
Germany – quantities of the so-called fugitive emissions concerned with 
human activity (see Figure 5).
While analysing the emission of greenhouse gases within the energy 
sector in the 28 EU member states, which is connected with all the proc-
esses of fuel combustion, it must be pointed out that Germany is respon-
sible for 10.4% of the emission, Poland – 4.8%, and UK – 4.5%. In the 
analysis of the emission performance itself of the energy sector in the 
28 EU member states, then Germany is responsible for as much as 28% 
of greenhouse gas emissions, Poland – almost 13%, and the UK – more 
than 12% (cf. EU energy in figures..., 2016).
In 2017 the European Commission presented the “EU Environmental 
Implementation Review” (The EU Environmental Implementation Re-
view..., 2017), in which it invoked earlier results of the analyses by the 
European Environment Agency (EEA), regarding air pollution. Accord-
ing to the EEA in the years 1990–2014 Poland effected major reductions 
in many kinds of air pollution. For instance, the emission of sulphur was 
forced down by 72%, emission of nitrogen oxide by 33%, emission of 
ammonia oxide by 36%. At the same time the emission of volatile organic 
compounds increased by 11%.
Following the Environmental Protection Inspectorate, the Supreme 
Audit Office quoted data, which indicated that in the period 2005–2013 
the biggest problem concerned with the air quality was the so-called su-
pernormative concentrations of particulates and the concentration of one 
of the organic compounds from the group of benzopyrenes, i.e. bezno(a)
pyrene – B(a)P. The gravity of the situation can be illustrated with the fact 
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that in the years 2011–2013 in 91% of the zones in which air quality is 
measured, the quality norms were exceeded. Besides, at the same time, 
the number of zones in which the standard values for atmospheric par-
ticulates (particulate matter – PM2.5) were exceeded, was rising. Still, it 
should be acknowledged that the number of zones with exceeded accept-
able concentrations of particulate matter PM10 has dwindled (in: Och-
rona powietrza..., 2014, pp. 21–24).
However, it is worth noting that in the years 2009–2012 the signifi-
cance of many factors affecting the emission of PM10 decreased, which 
comes to be expressed in the fact that an increasingly important role is 
being played by the so-called low emissions, and a minor role is being 
played by the transport- and industry-related pollution. This trend is de-
picted with the aid of the data from 2007–2012, in which a progressive 
rise in the emission of B(a)Ps concerned with individual building heating 
systems is to be observed – a rise from 45.8% to 96% (Ochrona powie­
trza..., 2014, pp. 21–24).
As regards the atmospheric particulate matter (PM2.5), when com-
pared to the other 28 EU member states, the influence of the communal 
sector, that is the low emission, is significant in Poland, but lower than 
the EU average value. At the same time, one can observe in Poland an im-
pact of factors concerned with energy conversion, that is the energy and 
transport sector (coal burning, biomass co-firing, transport fuel burning), 
whereby the emission performance of atmospheric particulate matter 
(PM2.5) is higher than the EU-28 average (Sytuacja zdrowotna ludności 
Polski..., 2016, pp. 289–300).
According to the EEA the air quality in Poland, given the concentra-
tion of fine mode aerosols, may have caused more than 48,000 premature 
deaths, where the concentration of O3 may have caused more than 1,000 
deaths, and the concentration of NO2 may have caused more than 1,600 
deaths (Air quality in Europe..., 2016, pp. 60–61). According to the data 
of the National Institute of Public Health-National Institute of Hygiene, 
in 2013 in Poland cardiovascular disease accounted for around 70% of the 
adverse health effects resulting from the emission of PM2.5. Moreover, 
according to the same data, the air quality also affects the uptrend in the 
overall balance of premature mortality causes related to malignant tu-
mours (Sytuacja zdrowotna ludności Polski..., 2016, pp. 289–300).
Another group of indexes comprises energy efficiency indexes that 
may be concerned with energy conversion itself, as well as with the ratio 
of energy conversion to, say, GDP or GHG emissions. Hence, the energy 
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efficiency as a general concept can be characterised through such indexes 
as: (1) the Energy Intensity of Economy index, (2) the Carbon Intensity 
index, (3) the Gross Inland Consumption of Energy per capita index, 
(4) the Final Electricity Consumption per capita index, (5) the Primary 
Energy Intensity index (cf. Forsström et. al., 2011, pp. 12–31; Energy Ef-
ficiency Indicators..., 2014; EU energy in figures..., 2016).
In the analysis the attention was focused on the economy efficiency, 
that is the Energy Intensity of Economy index, which is a ratio of gross 
energy use and gross domestic product. This index is supposed to illus-
trate the amount of energy needed to generate one unit of gross domestic 
product (see Figure 6). The index defines the use of energy in the pro-
duction process in individual sectors of the state’s economy. The differ-
ences in the level of energy intensity may point to a level of economic 
development, an economic structure, technological advancement and the 
kind of carriers used in the production of primary energy. In the case of 
a low value of energy intensity, conclusions can be drawn as to a greater 
efficiency in the process of fuel management. Still, it should be pointed 
out that low energy intensity may characterise countries with low eco-
nomic growth with the proviso that they feature low energy use in general 
(cf. Pach-Gurgul, 2012, pp. 166–167; Energy glossary..., 2016; Rosicki, 
2016, p. 232).
As regards Poland, on the basis of the data concerned with the eco-
nomic efficiency index, it can be pointed out that Poland’s energy intensity 
in 2015 decreased by more than 56% compared to 1995, by almost 37% 
compared to 2000, and by more than 29% compared to 2005. According 
to the comparative analysis, it must be concluded that Poland is among 
the 28 EU countries with the highest value of the energy intensity index, 
which typifies the countries in Central and Eastern Europe (cf. Rosicki, 
2016, pp. 225–236). In 2015 among the 28 EU countries with a higher 
index value of energy intensity of the economy reckoned were only the 
Czech Republic, Estonia and Bulgaria, whereas the energy intensity of 
the Bulgarian economy was nearly twice as high. The countries with an 
energy intensity index similar to Poland included Slovakia, Hungary and 
Romania.
In the period 2004–2014 we witnessed a steady growth of GDP, which 
in 2014 reached a value 45% bigger than in 2004. The greatest growth 
rate was registered in the industrial sector, which at the same time was 
characterised by a considerable energy intensity (Efektywność..., 2016, 
p. 11). For instance, the Polish processing industry is dominated by three 
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energy-intensive industries – the smelting, the chemical and the mineral 
industry, which in 2014 in total accounted for 55% of energy use, while 
a decade earlier they accounted for 60% (Efektywność..., 2016, p. 18; Ko-
morowska, Mirowski, 2016, pp. 297–305; Skoczkowski, Bielecki, 2016a, 
pp. 5–18). The changes in the index values illustrate the processes taking 
place in the Polish economy, as well as the energy transition processes 
themselves (Szczerbowski, 2013, pp. 35–46).
It is noteworthy that the greatest dynamics with regard to the improve-
ment of energy efficiency was in the engineering, textile and smelting 
industries. At the same time, some slow changes as to the improvement 
of energy intensity took place in the timber, chemical and other industries. 
As for the paper industry there was an observable rise in energy intensity 
(Efektywność..., 2016, p. 20).
R. Szczerbowski points out that the power generation industry, includ-
ing the electric power industry, may as well be subjected to activities aimed 
at improving energy efficiency. This follows from the fact that considerable 
attention is frequently focused on the energy user, while it stands to reason 
that losses can be contained by way of focusing on electrical energy pro-
duction, transmission and distribution processes. For instance, according to 
Figure 6. Energy Intensity of the Economy Index for Poland 2005–2015
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R. Szczerbowski the average efficiency of solid fuel exploitation amounts 
to about 35%, while in the energy transmission and distribution processes, 
losses are estimated at 9%. Another problem is the conversion technology 
itself, since it is estimated that the efficiency of electrical energy production 
in gas-fired systems amounts to 50%, while in the case of coal-fired power 
stations, the average efficiency amounts to 35% (Szczerbowski, 2013, pp. 
35–46; Gollinger-Tarajko, Zaręba, 2015). As regards Poland, improvement 
of the quality of infrastructure in the generation, transmission and distribu-
tion sector will be of great significance; also, attention should be paid to 
new technologies in the combustion systems, combined heat and power 
generation and smart grid (cf. Marecki, 2005; Davoli et. al., 2012; Skocz-
kowski, Bielecki, 2016b, pp. 9–14).
It is worthwhile to spotlight the necessity to increase the installed 
capacity of the power plants and to modernise the currently operational 
infrastructure. In the first case, a lack of outlays may result in a power 
shortage, which may directly impact the energy supply security. In the 
second case, it must be pointed out that the hard coal- and lignite coal-
fired commercial power plants account for 75% of the installed capacity. 
In addition, the condition of generating units in Poland must be taken into 
consideration, because 58.64% of these are more than 30 years old, and 
13.88% are 26–30 years old. Similar statistics apply to boilers in thermal 
power stations, where 63.38% of these have been operating for more than 
30 years (Sprawozdanie z wyników..., 2015; Zapewnienie mocy..., 2015; 
Sprawozdanie z działalności..., 2016, pp. 39–144).
Summary and conclusions
The object of analysis in the text comprises selected problems of Po-
land’s energy policy, and hence the analysis is not of an overall character. 
Thus, there is a necessity for in-depth studies on the presented issues. In 
order to elaborate the objective scope of the research problem, the follow-
ing research questions have been included in the text: (1) To what extent 
do the institutional and legal solutions affect the efficiency of the energy 
policy pursued in Poland?, (2) Which of the scenarios for the development 
of the Polish energy policy should be considered most likely?, (3) Which 
of the problem issues isolated in the analysis should be considered the 
greatest challenge to the Polish energy policy? The individual questions 
have been related to the following conclusions:
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(1) Conclusions
It must be pointed out that the institutional and legal solutions with re-
gard to the formulation of the Polish energy policy are inadequate. The 
main problems related to this include: (1) the legal status of the approved 
“planning documents” of the energy policy, (2) a lack of real responsi-
bility for the lack of the implementation of the approved “planning do-
cument” on the energy policy, (3) a lack of stable solutions in respect of 
the energy policy directions, (4) a lack of strategic solutions in respect of 
future challenges facing the energy policy. Besides, it must be pointed 
out that the consolidation of individual areas of issues concerned with the 
energy industry in one Ministry (the Minister of Energy) is appropriate, 
but there must follow more changes that would encompass selected issues 
concerned with the environmental protection and corporate governance 
of state-owned companies operating in this field.
(2) Conclusions
The Poland’s Energy Policy Until 2050 draft features three scenarios 
– a balanced one, a nuclear one and gas + RES one. It must be pointed 
out that the choice of strategic directions of the Polish energy policy is 
affected by the two main political factors – the internal and the external 
one. In the first case, of great significance is the question of who currently 
exercises legislative and executive power. One can assume that liberal, 
left-wing and “pro-EU” parties would be more willing to make decisions 
resulting in the change of the main energy policy directions, which are 
still connected with the maintenance of something that can be termed 
a “coal culture.” Still, it should be pointed out that despite the political 
stand, political decisions about the energy industry will be affected by 
interest groups connected with the coal sector and the traditional (co-
nventional) energy generation. In the second case, Poland’s membership 
of the European Union is of the greatest significance, which involves the 
necessity to fulfil the requirements collectively laid down by the mem-
ber states and concerned with the protection of the natural environment 
and the energy industry. Poland’s participation in the European Union 
structures enforces more progressive solutions concerned with the energy 
sector, and hence it must be admitted that the policy processes as part 
of the individual community policies, and the integration processes have 
a considerable influence on the decision processes on the national level. 
It is worth adding that new work on the energy policy directions is neces-
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sary, whereby a more profound and wide-ranging transformation of the 
Polish energy industry as well as a selection of key technologies would 
be effected.
(3) Conclusions
The text features an analysis of the main problem issues – the follo-
wing challenges facing the Polish energy policy: (1) energy dependen-
ce, (2) energy monoculture, (3) a development level of renewable energy 
sources (and/or low-emission sources), (4) emission performance, and 
(5) energy efficiency. It should be pointed out that the greatest challenge 
facing the Polish energy policy is the necessity to conduct the transforma-
tion of the energy sector, which is still and to a significant degree based 
on coal. The action undertaken in this respect by the authorities appears 
to be inadequate, particularly if we take into account the fact that the 
recoverable hard coal reserves recognised till this day will last for about 
30–40 years. Given the fact that Norway is staging an energy revolution, 
and Germany is to stage one in the forthcoming decades, it is quite likely 
that Poland will run up against a technological gap and thus remain on 
the economic periphery. Besides, it should be emphasised that changes to 
the energy structure might to a considerable degree affect other problems, 
e.g. emission performance, energy efficiency. For the changes to the ener-
gy sector to be effected, the conclusions presented above as part of the 
summary should be taken into consideration.
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Streszczenie
Zakres przedmiotowy analizy zawartej w tekście skupia się na wybranych pro-
blemach polityki energetycznej Polski. W tekście poruszono trzy zagadnienia zwią-
zane z polityką energetyczną Polski: (1) instytucjonalno-prawne, (2) prognostyczne 
i (3) problemowe. W pierwszym przypadku, zwrócono uwagę na ustawowe rozwią-
zania w zakresie celów, zadań, modelu i elementów polityki energetycznej oraz na 
odpowiedzialność podmiotów za jej realizację. W drugim przypadku zaprezentowa-
no scenariusze rozwoju polityki energetycznej, poddano je również krótkiej anali-
zie porównawczej. Natomiast w trzecim przypadku, uwagę skupiono na prezentacji 
następujących kwestii: (1) zależności energetycznej, (2) monokultury energetycznej, 
(3) poziomu rozwoju odnawialnych źródeł energii, (4) emisyjności oraz (5) efektyw-
ności energetycznej.
W celu uszczegółowienia problemu badawczego w tekście zaprezentowane zo-
stały następujące pytania badawcze: (1) W jakim stopniu rozwiązania instytucjo-
nalno-prawne wpływają na efektywność prowadzonej polityki energetycznej w Pol-
sce?, (2) Który ze scenariuszy rozwoju polskiej polityki energetycznej należy uznać 
za najbardziej prawdopodobny?, (3) Które z wyodrębnionych w analizie zagadnień 
problematycznych należy uznać za największe wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki ener-
getycznej?
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energetyczne, struktura produkcji energii, zależność energetyczna, odnawialne źródła 
energii, emisyjność sektora energetycznego, efektywność energetyczna

